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In recent years, a view on two key
moral emotions, shame and guilt, seems
to be establishing itself in some sec-
tors of psychology, based mainly on the
research of Tangney and Dearing (2004)
and their “Test of Self-Conscious Affect”
(TOSCA). On this view, guilt is a produc-
tive force in our moral lives, while shame
is morally counterproductive and psycho-
logically harmful. Therefore, one should
cultivate guilt and fight shame. But this
conclusion is problematic for two main
reasons, among others. On the one hand,
the distinction that grounds it is too sim-
plistic: the boundary between guilt and
shame is farmore blurry and complex than
this account acknowledges. On the other
hand, it operates on a functionalistic def-
inition of morality, where “moral” means
“prosocial,” which is ultimately insuffi-
cient to account for the moral role of these
emotions. The functionalistic approach
neither does justice to the self-conscious
aspects of guilt and shame nor to the
interactive dimensions of morality, as a
shared practice we engage in with others
(Calhoun, 2004).
TANGNEY AND DEARING’S ACCOUNT
According to Tangney and Dearing (2004),
the main difference between shame and
guilt lies in their objects of focus: shame
focuses on the ashamed self, while guilt
focuses on behavior. In shame we feel bad
about the way we are, about some charac-
teristic or feature of ours, while in guilt we
feel bad about our actions or omissions,
about having done something wrong, bro-
ken a norm or harmed somebody. On
this view, because self is perceived as
much more difficult to change or undo
than behavior, shame leads to antisocial
tendencies (shunning contact with oth-
ers, lashing out in anger), and ultimately
to low self-esteem, depression and addic-
tions. In contrast, guilt motivates prosocial
efforts (apologizing, attempting to undo
or compensate the harm done), and it
is not correlated to low self-esteem or
addictions. Therefore guilt is seen as pro-
ductive and shame as counterproductive.
However, another finding of Tangney’s
should give us pause. In a study of incar-
cerated offenders, Tangney and Stuewig
claim that the only people who have no
capacity for shame are psychopaths; there-
fore they conclude that in “extreme pop-
ulations” some shame is better than the
absence of any self-evaluative emotion, as
it offers a ray of hope for social reinte-
gration (Tangney and Stuewig, 2004, p.
327). But if shame is thus in some way
connected to moral sensibility, why should
this conclusion only hold for “extreme
populations”?
PROBLEMSWITH THE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN SHAME AND GUILT
Let us take a closer look at the prob-
lems entailed by this account. First,
although Tangney and Dearing’s defini-
tions of shame and guilt, based on the
work of Helen Block Lewis (1971), are
widely accepted and indicate a helpful
distinction, they should be handled with
care. Tangney et al. (1996) have shown that
people tend to have trouble distinguish-
ing between shame and guilt (while they
find it much easier to distinguish between
shame and embarrassment). Dearing and
Tangney (2011, pp. 9–11) explain this as
an error of judgment or a confusion on the
part of therapists or clients, but I disagree.
Dearing and Tangney present these emo-
tions as two perfectly discrete processes
that produce very different responses and
have very different functions, but this is
very dubiously the case. Guilt and shame
are complex self-conscious emotions, with
a high degree of cognitive specification and
wide variations from culture to culture.
They are in the same emotional territory,
they share a vast phenomenal ground and
work together inmany ways. Some authors
(Ortony, 1987; Elison, 2005) claim that
they are two slightly different cognitive
specifications of the same basic affective
phenomenon, which would explain why
some times they are hard to distinguish,
and should cast doubts on attempts at
sharply differentiating their functions.
Tangney and Dearing’s definitions of
shame and guilt rely on a clear separation
between self and behavior, where “self”
refers to the set of features that define an
individual. Instead, I believe that selfhood
should be conceived as a dynamic process
of self-conscious individuation that can
rely on different dimensions in different
contexts (see, e.g., Zahavi, 2005; Reddy,
2008; Rochat, 2009). According to Tangney
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and Dearing, in shame, self-individuation
takes place in terms of a negative fea-
ture that is perceived as defining the self
as a whole: for example, greed. I perceive
myself as greedy and I am ashamed of
myself as a result. In my view, this account
overlooks several dimensions of the shame
experience that play a crucial role in
the process of self-individuation, namely
embodiment, situatedness and temporal-
ity (Guenther, 2011; Zahavi, 2012; León,
2013): I apprehend myself not simply as
a (any) greedy individual, but as this sin-
gular one, me, put on the spot here and
now. As León (2013, p. 211) puts it, to
feel shame is “to experience in intersub-
jective contexts the irreducibility of one’s
own particular subjective situation in the
world.” Admittedly, these phenomenolog-
ical dimensions don’t render themselves
easily to operationalization and testing.
But my worry is not so much that descrip-
tions of shame and guilt are inaccurate, but
that strong moral conclusions are drawn
from them. Behavior often contributes
crucially to dynamic and situational self-
individuation, so the boundary between
them is blurry and permeable. Let me be
clear here: I agree that self and behavior
are concepts that mark a helpful distinc-
tion. But Tangney and Dearing further tell
us that, in the interest of morality, we
ought to disconnect them, that our emo-
tions of shame and guilt do just that, and
that a focus on behavior is morally prefer-
able to a focus on self—indeed, it is not
merely preferable, it is the morally good
choice versus the morally bad choice (see
Tangney and Dearing, 2004, esp. ch. 5 and
6). This entails that there are no situations
where shame might be the more appropri-
ate moral response, which is questionable
(ought citizens of Western countries feel
guilty, as opposed to ashamed, of our gov-
ernments’ failure to prevent the genocides
in Rwanda and Bosnia, for example? See
Hutchinson (2008) and Morgan (2008) on
this issue).
A more serious concern is that Tangney
and Dearing’s very definitions of shame
and guilt already imply many of the fac-
tors they are trying to test. In particular,
the antisocial and destructive nature of
shame and the prosocial and construc-
tive nature of guilt are presupposed by
and built into their TOSCA tests (see
Ferguson and Stegge, 1998; Luyten et al.,
2002; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2011; Nelissen
et al., 2013, p. 358). Luyten et al. (2002)
have shown that the original TOSCA
overwhelmingly represents cases of mild,
adaptive guilt related to reparation, and
maladaptive aspects of shame related to
low self-esteem. Drawing on these find-
ings, Giner-Sorolla et al. (2011, p. 446)
reach the conclusion that “TOSCA guilt
measures the motivation to respond to
one’s own misdeeds with compensatory
action, whereas TOSCA shame measures
the tendency to experience intense emo-
tions of guilt and shame from the appraisal
of self-blame, and to a lesser extent the
desire to withdraw from others.” Thus, the
test does not track shame and guilt, but
two different ways of dealing with them.
This takes me to another worry: the
TOSCA test is designed to measure a dis-
position or a character trait, proneness to
feel shame or guilt in various situations,
but in the subsequent interpretation of
results, Tangney and Dearing extend their
conclusions to individual episodes of these
emotions. This is problematic, because, as
Nelissen et al. (2013, p. 359) explain, the
characteristics of the people who are gen-
erally predisposed to feel a particular emo-
tion in a wide array of circumstances tell
us very little about the function and effects
of isolated episodes of that emotion in just
any person. From the finding that shame-
proneness is associated with low self-esteem
one cannot conclude that all individual
episodes of shame lead to low self-esteem.
The conclusion of Tangney and Dearing’s
study should be that people with certain
character traits or dispositions tend to
deal with emotions of self-assessment in
counterproductive ways, not that shame is
destructive and guilt is constructive across
the board.
INSUFFICIENT ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE
OF OTHERS
Further, some important elements to
determine whether shame will have pro-
ductive results or not are contextual and
depend on interaction. Indeed, De Hooge
et al. (2010) have found in their empir-
ical studies that shame can, and actually
does, lead to prosocial behavior in certain
circumstances, namely in dyadic interac-
tions where the partners have witnessed
the shameful behavior. If somebody does
something shameful in front of us, and
we see this person react with shame, our
opinion of the offender is likely to be
much less negative that if this person acts
shamelessly. This is so because, from a
second-person perspective, shame reveals
a concern for other people’s opinions, as
well as for shared norms and standards,
which can counter the effects of a previous
failing and partially restore other people’s
trust in the offending individual.
Tangney and Dearing disregard this.
They combine their functionalistic under-
standing of morality (behavior is consid-
ered moral when it tends to favor others
at the expense of oneself) with an agent-
centered take on it, which overlooks inter-
action and group dynamics. Actions are
judged as morally constructive if, from
the agent’s perspective, they are in any
measure altruistic or other-regarding, and
they are judged as morally counterproduc-
tive if the opposite is the case. But no
attention is paid to other people’s percep-
tions of and reactions to displays of these
emotions, or to the intersubjective inter-
actions that ensue, which can and often
do have prosocial consequences. Those
tendencies should be part of a function-
alistic story about the role of these emo-
tions in morality, but this is not enough.
In my view, this type of functionalis-
tic and consequentialist approach is too
narrow to fully account for the private
aspects of morality (self-evaluation, self-
transformation, deliberation and decision-
making) and overly simplifies the public
ones, reducing them to action tendencies.
Moreover, the abovementioned studies
of dyadic interactions only show a small
fraction of the important role of oth-
ers in shame. Rochat (2009) and Seidler
(1996, 2000), among others, offer accounts
of shame as crucial to the intersubjec-
tive development and sustainment of self-
consciousness. Shame would precisely be
crucial because it captures the experience
of self in relation to others and is the
product of a discrepancy between the first-
and the third-person perspectives on one-
self (Rochat, 2009, p. 105, 108, 109). This
role in self-constitution is also essential
to morality in ways that Tangney and
Dearing’s account cannot do justice to. It is
crucial for self-examination, learning and
self-transformation. In my view, the inter-
subjectivity and social self-consciousness
that shame entails constitute a ground
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from which morality can take off. A
capacity to feel shame would therefore be
morally productive in general, not only in
the contingent occasions in which shame
actually works to foster harmonious social
relations. One of the standard, albeit con-
troversial (see Deonna et al., 2011), claims
about shame is that it is a social emotion.
In my view, the correct way to interpret
this claim is not that in every instance
of shame I evaluate myself exactly as the
other does—an interpretation that has
its own share of problems—, but rather
that this emotion entails a widening of
my perspective where I recognize that a
part of who I am escapes my control
and depends on the other (see Sartre,
2003). Shame does not include all the ele-
ments that moral goodness requires, but
it does attest to our openness to others,
our “irreducible relationality” (Guenther,
2012, p. 71), and it can show that we
take seriously the shared practice of moral-
ity (Calhoun, 2004, pp. 139–146). Before
dismissing shame as morally counterpro-
ductive, its crucial role in intersubjective
self-constitution needs to be studied in
its full complexity (see, e.g., Schneider,
1977; Hutchinson, 2008; Reddy, 2008;
Williams, 2008; Rochat, 2009; Guenther,
2011; Zahavi, 2012; León, 2013; Welz,
2014). TOSCA-based research programs
overlook or flatten many of these issues,
and therefore can only offer a limited pic-
ture of the role of shame and guilt in
morality.
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